

THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLITICS OF SEOUL AS A COLONIAL CITY

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The purpose of this article is to examine the political logic behind early capitalist urban growth in Seoul, South Korea, focusing on its changing character during the Japanese colonial period, 1910-1945. Throughout a long history as a feudal state of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), Seoul was the symbolic place of national feeling and political power, and it was the distinctive premier city. The city's elite position was further strengthened by the developmentalist ideology of the Japanese colonial government.

This study analyzes the forces that guided the growth and development of Seoul under colonial rule. One dimension that is often neglected in current urban development studies of Korea is the historical dimension. Therefore, it is worth emphasizing that the events of the colonial period were of fundamental importance in helping to shape present patterns of urban growth and urbanization. The emphasis here is on exploring the consequences of urbanization for the colonial political system and the impact of governmental intervention on the patterns of urban growth and housing development. The impact of colonialism on urban development in Korea is to be understood as the impact of a Japanese (i.e., cultural), capitalist-industrialist, and colonial (i.e., politically dominant) power.¹ More specifically, this study shows how the colonial urban system, focusing on urbanization and its related housing and land development, is determined by the overall social and political structure. The ideas and practices developed in the early colonial period of urban Korea have had a lasting effect on the planning of Korea's cities. Thus, an analysis of this period aids in understanding the origins of the modern urban system and its organization in Korea.

In theory, colonial government provides an appropriate venue for examining the state-directed urban development argument. The focus is on the policies of state regulatory and planning agencies and the economic and class interests that the policies seek to advance in relation to patterns of private activity. It is argued that urban development policy became one of the significant means through which the Japanese colonial government maintained its respective political legitimacy. The state's influences on the urban development

process through its policies are patterned by the state's relationship with social groups.² Within this vein, this study will supplement the criticism that so many prevailing approaches are too focused on the state or society to explain urban development. Migdal gives us a suggestive starting point for the study of the role of the state: "The state-centered approach is a bit like looking at a mouse-trap without at all understanding the mouse."³ The interplay between the state and society has largely been derived from the political logic of the distributive effects of the state's development policies, namely, who benefits and who loses.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN CAPITALIST CITY IN KOREA

During the late nineteenth century, a rapid transition to capitalism occurred in Korea. Following unsuccessful attempts by France (1866) and the United States (1866 and 1871) to open the Korean peninsula, Japan invaded Kanghwa island (which is the island nearest to Seoul) by using warships to demand the opening of Korean ports. The Korean government was forced to sign the first treaty of amity with Japan in 1876.⁴ To acknowledge that capitalism had its origin in this period is to suggest that the roots of the vibrant and internationally recognized capitalism of South Korea today might in some way be traceable to Japan.⁵

*K-ism
traceable to Japan*

To block the Japanese from obtaining a monopoly on foreign invasions and receiving Western diplomats, the Korean government also concluded treaties of amity and commerce with the United States, England, Germany, Russia, France, and other nations at the end of the 1870s. These treaties seemed to offer the Western powers a break in Korea's long isolation,⁶ and these nations began to take an interest in relations with the late Yi dynasty. As a result, Korea ceased to be a "Hermit Kingdom" and became a part of the modern capitalist world.

Foreign residential quarters affected the existing urban structure during the early modernization period.⁷ Characterizing the preindustrial towns, the private handicraft industries in Seoul and other villages did not develop into factories until the late nineteenth century. Almost all the industrial activities in Korea utilizing the factory system of manufacturing were undertaken by Japanese entrepreneurs who emigrated to Korea after the Treaty of 1876.⁸

Unlike the previous era, this period was shaped more by external stimulus than by internal dynamism. In other words, the advent of the modern city in Korea was closely related to its opening to foreign residents and international mercantile trade. Increasing contact with the foreign capitalists began to enhance Seoul's economic dominance over its hinterland. In particular, the commercial treaty with Japan brought about a rapid expansion of foreign trade and its complete monopoly by Japan. On the other hand, China was menaced by the Japanese penetration into the Korean peninsula and concluded the

Korea-China Land and Sea Commercial Activity Treaty in 1882 to transform its relationship with Korea from a traditional dependent one to one based on equality. Seoul was opened by the treaty, which approved the Market Establishment Right for the Chinese in both Seoul and Yanghwajin. Immediately after the treaty's signing, Seoul became a place of struggle for the great capitalist powers by opening itself to other countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and China. With the opening of Seoul, the city wall was torn down, and the boundaries expanded to include the old market towns and lower class areas outside the walled city.

Starting from the Korea-Japan Eulsa Treaty in 1905, which had stolen the sovereignty of the Yi dynasty, Seoul underwent many changes and hardships. By establishing *to'nggam-bu* (residency-general) at Yongsan, on the banks of the Han River, the waterfront district thrived with Japanese soldiers and Korean workers. Thus, the old saying that anyone who dominates the Han River can dominate the Korean peninsula came true once again.

It is true that the open-door policy during the transition period in Korea gave rise to the emergence and rapid growth of some modern sectors in the Korean urban areas and particularly in Seoul. One of the most important was the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railroad that marked the beginnings of modern urban growth in Korea.⁹ A modern urban infrastructure was installed at the insistence of foreigners and a westernized Korean bourgeoisie that was beginning to emerge. Following the completion, Japan even took away the country's nominal sovereignty and turned Korea into a Japanese colony in 1910. The Japanese government degraded Seoul's political and administrative position by changing from direct control by the central government to control by the Kyongki province government.

Seoul-Busan RR

THE COLONIAL URBAN GROWTH OF SEOUL: DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

Most Korean demographers agree that Seoul started its distinct demographic transition during the colonial era. The population of Seoul was 25,000 in 1910 but exceeded 100,000 by 1944. During the same period, the city's population increased at an average annual rate of 5.2 percent, in comparison with the national growth rate of 1.6 percent. In particular, Seoul's population increased by 74 percent from 1930 to 1936. This rapid growth was absolutely due to the expansion of administrative districts in Seoul by Ordinance 18 of the government-general on February 14, 1936.¹⁰ The demographic shifts of Seoul in the colonial era can be explained by natural increase, rural decline, and Japanese immigration to Korea.

First, the decline in death rates was caused by the restoration of social order from the political and social turmoil in the late Yi dynasty and by improved public health measures instituted by the colonial government. From the early

1.
death rate ↓
↑
public health
measures

days of the colonial period in particular, Japanese authorities developed various health policies such as the prevention of infectious disease, sanitary improvements, the rigorous inspection of public places, the introduction of vaccination, and the enactment of sanitary regulations.¹¹ The crude death rate decreased from 29 births per 1,000 population in 1925-1929 to 22 in 1938-1942, falling 7 points within the two decades for which a detailed set of registration data is available. Concurrently, the colonial policies designed for the rapid growth of population produced a high growth rate throughout the colonial period.

Second, the volume of migration to the city during this time cannot be precisely measured because records of the annual figures were not maintained. However, many rural residents had to move to domestic urban areas, or to Manchuria and Japan, because of agricultural exploitation both by Japanese capitalists and by the Japanese colonial government's policies, namely, the Project for Land Survey, from 1910 to 1918. By 1925, nearly 30 percent of the total urban population in Korea was estimated as being migrants from the rural areas.¹²

Third, Seoul's population growth at this time was due to the Japanese government's immigration policy along with the rapid urbanization and industrialization since the Meiji reform. For the Japanese, immigration in particular was an essential part of their colonization program. By 1911, the Japanese government had instituted the Oriental Development Company, which had to send 30,000 Japanese per year and 350,000 to 500,000 Japanese to the Korean peninsula in the next eleven years.¹³ For the Japanese, it was practical and desirable to send several million emigrants from the Japanese islands to the relatively larger peninsula.¹⁴

At the same time, the Japanese government launched a policy of actively trying to assimilate Koreans into Japanese culture.¹⁵ The theory of assimilation was that the Koreans should first become Japanized, after which political rights would become theirs as a matter of course. By assimilating the Koreans, Japan attempted to create its own unique empire in Northeast Asia, different from the Western imperial core-periphery structure. It can be said that this intention prompted Japan to venture to establish the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in Northeast Asia. The government realized that the greater the number of Japanese migrants the greater the likelihood of success in its integration policy and therefore encouraged a larger migration from Japan.¹⁶

Finally, urban infrastructure is one of the important aspects of societies that has critically affected urban patterns and regions' incorporation into a changing role within the capitalist world system.¹⁷ The most significant factors for colonial urban development in Korea were the new transportation network's roads and railways that gave impetus to the large regional city and, consequently, the organization of the economy around regional marketing and financial centers. Changes in the transportation system are considered by many to

2. migration

3. immigration policy

4. assimilation

5. urban infra

have been the single most important determinant of urban morphology and residential differentiation within the city. This infrastructure shaped and/or reinforced Seoul's growth patterns, just as technology has changed urban structure.

Prior to the annexation of 1910, transportation development in Korea had already become a priority policy of the Japanese government. By 1894, the Japanese were already considering the construction of railways in Korea. All these would originate in Seoul, the capital, and would run approximately north-east, northwest, southeast, and southwest of the city. In 1906, the Japanese government took over all existing lines and placed them under the Railway Bureau of the protectorate, but upon the establishment of the government-general in 1910, their control once more changed hands to the Japanese colonial government. In spite of rugged terrain, nearly four thousand miles of rail line were completed by 1944. In short, railroad construction was intended to stimulate general economic development. Business interests saw that the railroad line was important because it opened up new markets, lowered the cost of moving Japanese goods into the interior, and facilitated rice trade.

In many theories of urban geography, urban primacy is an important characteristic of urban growth in most underdeveloped societies that experience a great degree of rural exodus and colonization.¹⁸ Even if the definition of urban primacy is burdened by both conceptual and practical difficulties, Table 1 shows the degree of urban primacy in colonial Korea from the notion of a three-city primacy, regional multiple-city primacy, and national population size. Table 1 indicates that, unlike the percentage of Seoul to the total population of Korea, Seoul's proportion to the total urban population of Korea continued to decline, except in 1940, the year a few *kun* (counties) of the Kyonggi province were incorporated into Seoul. By the same token, the population distribution of the three big cities also shows a similar phenomenon. Nevertheless, the data illustrate that although Seoul's percentage to the total population of Korea decreased,¹⁹ its urbanization pattern in the colonial era showed the characteristic of urban primacy.²⁰ By 1936, Seoul's population (677,241) was more than twice that of the second largest city, Pusan (206,386). As evidenced by the demographic trends, Seoul as a primate city continued to play the role of colonial exploiter in regard to other cities and rural areas.

Just as the physical structure of Seoul underwent tremendous changes during the colonial period, so did its economic base. One major area of such change was in the production of craft goods such as textiles and metal wares. There had always been industry in the city, if only because of the great demand for manufactured products continually generated by its huge population, but it was small in scale and traditional in organization and technology. During the colonial period, however, traditional handicrafts were seriously undermined by the effective penetration of cheaper, mass-produced substitutes from the factories of Japan.

urban
primacy

industrialization

TABLE 1
Trends of a Primate City and
Three Big Cities, 1925-1944 (in percentages)

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>1925</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1935</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1945</i>
Primate city (Seoul)					
Per three big cities	63.4	57.9	54.9	63.4	59.6
Per total urban areas	40.3	33.1	27.6	33.2	29.0
Per national population	1.6	1.7	2.8	4.1	4.2
Three big cities (Seoul, Pyongyang, Pusan)					
Per total urban areas	63.4	57.3	50.4	52.2	48.6
Per national population	2.8	3.2	3.5	6.0	6.4

SOURCE: Calculated from Government-General of Chosen, *Kokusei Chosa Hokokusho* (Report of National Power), corresponding years.

Korea's dependence on Japan as a colonial ruler was quite different from the other colonial arrangements of that time.²¹ Whatever Japan's fundamental purpose in annexing Korea might have been, it was a necessary step to achieving complete control of the Korean economy, making it part of the periphery of Japan.²² As a result, the Korean economy underwent a significant change, largely determined by a colonial government-general based on a political system of strict totalitarianism.²³ The colonial state was not merely a dictatorship but a military dictatorship, reflecting the strategic significance that Japan had attached to the Korean peninsula. Since there was no representation of Korean interests in Japanese national policy formulation, the economic policy of the colonial period was always in line with the changing needs of Japan. The economic policy of the colonial government was primarily directed toward developing Korea as a source of raw materials and as a market for Japanese manufactured products.

In the Seoul of the 1910s, the two societies, whose physical urban forms were being juxtaposed in the early colonial city, were organized around two different systems of economic production, most simply described as industrial and agricultural. There was still a large population involved in agriculture, although industrial occupations were rapidly growing in number. As a matter of fact, Japan's initial colonial policy was to increase agricultural production in Korea to meet Japan's growing need for rice.²⁴ The colonial government-general's economic policy was essentially an agriculture-first policy; relatively few measures of commerce and industry were taken by the government.

Japan began to build large-scale industries in Korea in the 1930s as part of an empirewide program of economic self-sufficiency and war preparation. Between 1939 and 1941, the manufacturing sector represented 29 percent of Korea's total economic production. The primary industries—agriculture, fishing, and forestry—represented only 49.6 percent of total economic production during the period, in contrast to having been 84.6 percent of total production

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between 1910 and 1912. When industrialization was in full swing, beginning in the early 1930s, the government's programs to aid businesses were mainly directed to benefit large factories supported by Japanese *zaibatsu*²⁵ capital rather than by local entrepreneurs.

A consequence of Japanese war preparation and the encouragement of Japanese *zaibatsu* investment resulted in a substantial expansion of heavy industries from 23 percent of factory product in 1930 to 50 percent in 1940. According to the Keijo (Seoul's Japanese name) Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Seoul produced 41 percent of Korea's textiles, 42 percent of its machinery, 74 percent of its lumber, 47 percent of its printing, and 25 percent of its food products.

The economic development that occurred under Japanese rule brought little benefit to the Koreans. Virtually all industries were owned either by Japan-based operations or by Japanese corporations in Korea. In 1924, the Japanese dominated Seoul's industrial establishments both in number and in value of production. It was pointed out in the newspaper *Tong-A Ilbo* (August 19, 1924) that Japanese manufacturers were mainly engaged in the production of machinery and chemistry, which required large-scale factories and advanced technology. Also, Japanese entrepreneurs were export oriented, the newspaper pointed out, and were trying hard to improve their products to fit the tastes of foreign markets. The lack of export-oriented Korean entrepreneurs was lamented by the same newspaper. Table 2 was derived from data provided by the *Tong-A Ilbo* in a series of articles. Although there is no way of proving or disproving the accuracy of these data, national statistics comparing the relative position of Japanese and Korean entrepreneurs in the same period tended to support the general trend indicated by the newspaper's data. At this time, both sources indicated the relatively poor showing of Korean industrial entrepreneurs.²⁶

In 1941, the Keijo Chamber of Commerce and Industry reported a significant increase in the number and production of Korean factories in Seoul. As for the nationality of the owners, 39.75 percent were owned by Japanese, while Koreans owned 59.06 percent. The remaining 1.19 percent were owned by foreigners. The evidence provided by the chamber clearly shows that, in comparison with those of the Japanese, Korean entrepreneurial activities increased more than proportionately in response to rising economic opportunities in Seoul. In terms of the number of factories owned by Koreans, the percentage increased from 37 percent in 1924 to 59 percent in 1939, completely reversing the superior position enjoyed by Japanese in 1924.

In terms of gross value of production, the achievement of the Korean entrepreneurs is even more impressive. In 1939, 42 percent of the gross value of factory production was attributed to Korean-owned establishments, compared to 14 percent in 1924. Nevertheless, the figures still give an indication of Japanese capital. Moreover, industrial product was concentrated—a tendency

heavy industry

little benefit
to Koreans

reversed

TABLE 2
Comparison of Japanese and
Korean Factories in Seoul (1924)

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Japanese Factories</i>	<i>Korean Factories</i>
Number of establishments	466 (63%)	269 (37%)
Building area (in py'ong ^a)	64,086	6,429
Paid-up capital (in yen)	44,686,857	18,685,047
Number of workers	13,987	1,714
Gross value of production	37,860,452 (86%)	6,299,570 (14%)

SOURCE: *Tong-A Ilbo*, August 20, 1924.

a. A py'ong is equivalent to 3.95 yards.

toward oligopoly favored by the colonial administration—with a mere 1.2 percent of all firms producing 80 percent of all factory products in 1939.²⁷

HOUSING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT UNDER COLONIAL RULE

The issue of housing was far from being a social concern until the beginning of the 1920s. Housing conditions began to deteriorate with changes in colonial economic policies, such as the Program of Land Survey, the Planning for Promotion of Industrial Rice Production, and the Program of Land Ownership Expansion. All of these stimulated the increase of rural migration to urban areas and Japanese immigration to Korea. By this time, *Tong-A Ilbo* reported on the housing problem in Seoul with the title “Housing Supply to Lower Classes: Reside on the Road in the East Tonight and in the West Tomorrow Night” (December 12, 1921). The housing problem in Seoul was not just limited to cave dwellers; rather, it was much more serious for the urban middle classes. The newspaper describes the situation, under the headline “6,000 Vagrants in Western Clothes,” as follows:

According to the Seoul City Government's housing survey, among the salary men in public offices, public corporations, banks and other private offices within the city, 6,390 persons do not possess their own housing. Among the number, 725 live in official or private residences, 539 in inns, and 5,135 are homeless persons. (*Tong-A Ilbo*, December 12, 1921)

Furthermore, in 1930, the Japanese government turned Korea into a weapons depot for a continental invasion (the Manchuria War in October 1931) and forced an industrialization policy, adding to rural-urban migration. During the two decades from 1925 to 1944, the number of households in Seoul tripled (see Table 3). In accordance with the rapid increase of housing demand, many dwellings were supplied by private housing developers, but the housing

TABLE 3
Housing Distribution in Seoul, 1933

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Households</i>	<i>Number of Housing</i>	<i>Shortage Housing</i>	<i>Shortage Rate</i>
Korean	270,590	54,226	46,012	8,214	15.15%
Japanese	106,782	24,388	23,719	669	2.75%
Foreign	5,119	905	868	37	4.1%
Total	382,491	79,519	70,599	8,920	11.2%

SOURCE: *Keijo Nippo-Sa, Chosen Annual Report* (Keijo, 1935).

problem remained, and moreover, it was exacerbated by the serious lack of construction materials at the end of colonial period. By 1944, the rate of housing shortage in Seoul was 44 percent.

Despite the fact that the housing problem was serious in Seoul as well as in other big or medium-sized cities,²⁸ throughout the whole colonial period, the government-general never established a specific housing policy until the late 1930s. The reason was that although the housing problem was serious, as Table 3 shows, it was an urgent problem for Koreans, not for Japanese.

no housing policy until late 1930s

With both the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the Pacific War in 1939, the Japanese colonial government had to construct many military-industrial complexes on the Korean peninsula and thus felt the importance of the enormous demand for housing by industrial employees. In the Consultation Meeting on Current Affairs on October 6, 1938, the government first officially talked about the housing problem in Korea. The major plans decided were (1) an increase in public housing, (2) the establishment of the status of the housing and tenement union, (3) an improvement and increase of small houses for laborers, and (4) the establishment of the housing association for squatter improvement.

First, the colonial government used land readjustment techniques to obtain housing sites. The Land Readjustment Project (LRP), which originated from the Law Concerning Land Transfer (Lex Addicks) adopted in the Frankam-Main Land Readjustment Act in Germany in 1902 to consolidate fragmented agricultural land holdings,²⁹ is a method of converting land from nonurban to urban use, using site planning and the installation of infrastructure and public facilities.³⁰ The objective of the project in Germany was not only to reapportion land holdings but also to sell off some of the land to provide capital for the construction of the roads and public facilities that were required for the sale as a whole.

1. land readjustment

The basic ideas were picked up by Japanese planners at the end of World War I and incorporated into legislation designed to control urban development. In Japan, the LRP began with the Act of Cultivated Land, which was used as the official instrument for urban housing site adjustment with the rapid

increase in the demand of land for factories and housing following the rise and development of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century. In Korea, since it was first enforced in Seoul in 1928, it has been used as one of the important tools for urban development until now.³¹ The Kyongsong (Seoul) Urban Replanning Report, in 1928, shows that the five old central districts of Seoul and the underdeveloped peripheral areas of the city were planned by the land readjustment technique. The LRP at that time was interpreted in a broad sense, including the simultaneous redevelopment of the old districts, like the urban renewal project today.

The housing policy of the colonial government was closely related to island Japan's insular war policy. Japanese urban scholar Tosida effectively notes that the Japanese government began to regard housing in terms of the maintenance of labor power and as a means of its reproduction throughout the Sino-Japanese War period.³² At this time, the Japanese government strongly emphasized the need of housing for laborers to increase the production of military equipment. There was no exception in its colony, the Korean peninsula. It was natural to use the Korean peninsula as a supply base for the war because Korea was located near the battlefield, mainland China. With the accomplishment of the Electric Network Plan after 1931, an abundant and cheap supply of electric power on the Korean peninsula promoted the penetration of Japanese *zaibatsu* into the country,³³ which increased housing demand by urban laborers. The Japanese government's motive for using housing policy as the instrument for the maintenance and preservation of labor power was to change the classical economic view that housing is just one of the durable consumer goods such as clothes or furniture. By this time, Japanese scholar Kamamoto in the journal *Social Policy Review* writes,

1931 electric power

Housing is absolutely short in Japan today. Low-income housing is especially true. . . . Laborers reproduce their own labor power by consuming the living materials in each household. Accordingly, housing for laborers is a place where they can maintain and preserve their own labor power, and by doing so, stimulate its reproduction.³⁴

The colonial government established the Housing Committee, composed of each director of bureaus within the government-general, by Imperial Ordinance 38, July 12, 1939.³⁵

However, the committee never held a meeting during the next three months. Rather, the Japanese government took actions that exacerbated the housing problem by announcing the Regulation Act of Land and Housing Rent by the Japanese Royal Ordinance 704. The Act states that further increases of land and housing rent were frozen. This Act, together with other acts such as the Price Control Act (Ordinance 703), and the Temporary Measure Act of Wage (Ordinance 705), was to control price and curb inflation during the war period.³⁶

Nevertheless, prices continued to go up, and even essentials were marketed in an underground economy. To add to the economic recession, a shortage of building materials prevented the construction of private rental houses.

In this economic recession, the active intervention of the colonial government was immediate. As an alternative to promoting housing development, the colonial government created the Chosen Housing Corporation (CHC) on June 14, 1941. The CHC was directly influenced by the Japanese Housing Corporation, established on March 6, 1941, to solve the serious housing problems at that time.

By 1942, the CHC had constructed five hundred houses in Dorim Complexes, one thousand houses in Sangdo Complexes, and five hundred houses in Simdaebang Complexes.³⁷ Clarence Perry's neighborhood unit³⁸ was first introduced in these new complexes. Useful facilities, such as hospitals, public baths, and shops on every block, were located within the complexes. This method was used as an effective mechanism for reproducing and protecting Labor power and for controlling and drafting Koreans during wartime. The government-general intended to construct a housing style that added a Korean-style home to a regular Japanese-style home: indeed, only one room was built with the Korean underfloor heating system, which is congenial to the Korean people's living condition. By doing so, the government advertised its intention of assimilation even in housing production.

neighborhood
unit

In the process of land acquisition, the government was not in serious conflict with native Koreans. With the reorganization of landownership in 1915, a large portion of the idle land in urban areas had already been transformed to Japanese possession or colonial government property. In fact, the process of urban renewal and municipal district reform in Seoul, from 1912 to 1927, was a bitter experience for the colonial government because of the readjustment work compensation. For example, total expenditure during the period was 11,250,000 won (the Korean unit of currency), and 64 percent of this amount, 7,170,000 won, was disbursed in the name of land compensation.³⁹ Although the exact acreage is unclear, according to newspapers, governmental officers, and other people of that time, if government property is included, the Japanese may have controlled more than two-thirds of the land.⁴⁰

For the government-general, the LRP was the most rational approach because it could be accomplished at minimum public expenditure. The most important task of the land adjustment was to secure as much land as possible for public facilities after applying the *chongbo*⁴¹ reduction rate of land for landowners within the target areas. As a result, the government-general usurped 20 percent to 25 percent of the capital gain from every landowner in the name of the land adjustment. Most important, the reduction rate was only to obtain the land gratuitously for public facilities and never included the substitutive land for construction cost. Instead, the authority appropriated beneficial rates for the work. The Kyongsong Street Subdivision Ordinance obviously shows

the benefit principle system that was introduced from the Act of Cultivated Land in Japan: Article 48 of the ordinance notes, "The public authorities for the LRP could appropriate the total or limited costs for the work to the landowners within the work target areas under the control of the Government-General" (Article 48).

When the LRP was almost completed, the landowners began to sell their lands. In the process of land transfer and acquisition, the government created the Land Advice Office (LAO) in the Department of Urban Planning and gave the office the authority to play the role of real estate agent. Sang Hoon Youn, vice director of general affairs in the Kyongsong city government during that time, noted in an interview that "one of the most important roles of the LAO was to decide a conventional price which was lower than the market land-price in its day." In spite of the grand advertisements and public lectures, however, actual land transactions were minimal. Moreover, the economic recession added to the transaction difficulties for citizens. Under this slack land market, the only customer was the CHC, established in 1941. By this time, the CHC planned to secure housing sites for future use and purchased an enormous number of housing sites at low prices. Many of these sites were transferred to the Chosen Housing Administration after the 1945 liberation.

THE LOGIC OF COLONIAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Previously, there were various schools of thought regarding how to define Korea's relationship with Japan.⁴² Given the present evidence, there can be little doubt that Korea was a colony under dictatorial Japanese rule and that the country was developed not as an autonomous unit but as part of the Japanese empire. The changes in urban Korea during this period closely reflect Japanese colonial policy, which was deliberately planned and effectively carried out by the imperial regime. Compelling evidence of Korea's colonial character is that "the military-bureaucratic power"⁴³ of the government-general occupied outstanding positions in every walk of life. Its ultimate objective was to maximize the benefits that would accrue either directly or indirectly to Japan.⁴⁴

The main logic of the impact of colonialism on urbanization would be one of dominance-dependence, where the ultimate source of social, economic, and political power rests in the colonizing metropolitan society, with physical force being the ultimate sanction in the colonized society. As described in the previous section, during the first two decades of colonial rule, Japan saw Korea mainly as a source of agricultural products that could be exported to Japan, and most of the investment went into agricultural development and the construction of transportation facilities necessary to get farm produce to ports, particularly Pusan and Inch'on.

In a similar context, the economic structure of urban Korea was being changed through the influence of Japanese entrepreneurs and the imperialist activity of the Japanese government. Predominantly manual manufacturing activities gradually became factory directed. A uniform and centralized monetary and banking system was established. The major cities were rebuilt, and new cities were further developed with the aid of the development of new systems of transportation and communication. However, as Yun-Sik Chang has argued, most Korean cities were developed in response to the new industrial requirements of the Japanese expansionist movement of the late 1930s.⁴⁵ Moreover, the manufacturing growth that occurred under colonial rule was determined by the requirements of Japanese industrialization rather than Korean needs. Contemporary observer George McCune commented (well before dependency theory had appeared), "The Korean economy was Japanese-owned and Japanese-directed and in no sense an entity in and of itself, but rather the geographical location of a portion of the wider configuration of the economy of Japan."⁴⁶

The colonial administration carefully controlled capital investment in Korea, through the *zaibatsu* and the Japanese Overseas Department. This policy was aimed at creating the Korean economy's total dependency on Japan. The Japanese owned 90 percent of the total paid-up capital of all corporations in Seoul in 1938 and 85 percent of all manufacturing and industrial facilities in 1944; they also controlled all the major banking companies, insurance companies, and so on. Korean capital was limited in most industrial sectors and confined to small-scale industry.⁴⁷

If there was any indigenous influence on the city's economic achievement, it was made possible by an effective coalition with the colonial ruling power groups including government elites and Japanese capitalists. Accordingly, local entrepreneurs had to gain the support and recognition of the state ministries and state-controlled financial institutions to survive and compete with their Japanese counterparts. The close working ties they formed with the strong colonial state defined business-state relations, as several studies of major local entrepreneurs have documented.⁴⁸ The Japanese government also foisted upon Koreans an ideology of incorporation, emphasizing a structural family principle and an ethical *filiale*. This influence remains strong. As Korea industrialized in the postwar period, it has fostered *zaibatsu*-like conglomerates, with extensive family interpenetration and ideologies of familial hierarchy and filial loyalty (e.g., the New Spirit movement in the 1970s in South Korea and corporate familism in North Korea).⁴⁹

Immediately after the official annexation, the colonial government implemented the Land Project to establish a modern private landowning system. This was crucial for control of the Korean economy. Upon the completion of the project, the Japanese government was successful in its initial attempt to use Korean landowners' capital by encouraging the formation of several Korean-owned banks.⁵⁰

property rights
modernized
immediately

As members of the *yangban* class, these Korean landowners, willingly or unwillingly, cooperated with the Japanese authorities. Close ties with the Japanese government were essential to Korean business success. Forms of political coalition by Korean indigenous elites were more salient within the structure of the colonial administration, such as through the Central Advisory Council (Chungch'uwon)⁵¹ advisers or provincial governors.

From this point of view, it may be noted that the coalition between the colonial state, Japanese capitalists, and the pro-Japanese clique, including both the indigenous aristocratic *yangban* and the new entrepreneurial class, played a central role in the early colonial urban process.⁵² Nevertheless, Korean entrepreneurs faced difficulties in gaining support from the colonial state. The few who gained its favor were then able to gain extensive support for various urban infrastructure projects, again contributing to the concentration of capital among a few established local entrepreneurs.⁵³ In fact, some business elites won at least a consultative role in policy making in Seoul's economy through participation on the boards of larger Japanese combines, or *zaibatsu*; prominence in business-policy associations; and their position in the local economy as corporate owners.⁵⁴

The colonial state was the critical actor in the coalition. During Japanese rule, the colonial government abolished the existing feudal class distinctions and subordinated all classes to the colonial state bureaucracy. This pattern persisted into the postindependence period and provided a model for state-directed development in South Korea, based on the political culture of strong centralism and authoritarianism inherited from the colonial period.

colonial state
"critical actor"

There was no possibility, however, of a return to precolonial Korea. Japanese colonialism had introduced capitalist social relations on a wide scale, destroyed the traditional legitimacy of the landlord-tenant relationship in the popular consciousness, and ruined the authority of the old aristocratic ruling class. The Korean people began to accept such concepts as capitalism and entrepreneurship as important ingredients for economic improvement. As a result, in many ways, the concepts and the way of life of the people became nontraditional as they maintained a delicate balance between tradition and modernity. Urban Korea had irreversibly entered a period of profound change.

The major line of colonial urban planning in Korea was often focused by capitalist theories, considering housing and land development as an instrument of reproducing labor forces for the effective achievement of the imperial Japanese government's political goal. This follows Castells's argument that capital's interest in "reproducing labor power" provides the motive for state intervention in the field of urban planning.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the role of the government is particularly important because of its control over the patterns and conditions of provision of collective consumption, such as housing and land. This logic also directed the LRP for housing site development by the colonial government. Japanese scholar Nishiyama criticized that "the land readjustment approach is used as the cheap instrument of urban development through

which the lands for public facilities were obtained not by direct purchase but free of charge from the powerless Korean landowners."⁵⁶

Focusing on policy instruments in modern capitalist societies, the state's economic responsibility is growth oriented, and its political responsibility is distributive. In most underdeveloped countries, the former is emphasized more than the latter, but the distributive policy would be stressed in situations where there exists social and political instability. Plausible evidence derived from the uneven development between the Korean village, Pukch'on, and the Japanese village, Namch'on, is found in the LRP used to decrease Korean resistance. Also, the construction of housing complexes within Seoul in both the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War periods was an important political tool of the colonial government.

During the colonial period, the LRP was a firm and powerful state-directed program in which state power completely blocked the power of private developers or corporations. Based on the concept of centralized government power, the government-directed land readjustment work under colonial rule was succeeded by, and developed into, the popular instrument for urban development under the postindependence authoritarian government. Most of the LRPs today, big projects in particular, have been implemented by public authorities such as local governments, the Korea National Housing Corporation, and the Korea Land Development Corporation.⁵⁷

Colonial heritage was largely maintained even after independence, and recognition of the basic and lasting changes under colonial rule in the direction of capitalistic concepts of urban development, as well as modernization, is a first step in intellectual exploration. In particular, the zeal for rapid national economic development of postindependence Korea has called for a large measure of centralized planning and government interventionism. As Eckert notes, the model shared a number of elements with its contemporary Japanese archetype: the pivotal economic function of the state; the concentration of private economic power in the hands of a small number of large business groups, or *jaebol* (*zaibatsu*); and the emphasis on exports.⁵⁸ It is by no means an exaggeration to say that this political and ideological factor has contributed to a certain imbalance between urban and rural areas and has accelerated urbanization in postindependence Korean society.

CONCLUSION

The manner in which the urban structure of Seoul was shaped during the colonial period furnishes clues not only to the nature of early urban development but to the character of colonial life in larger terms. At the end of the nineteenth century, foreign penetration of the Korean Peninsula proved to be irresistible, and the Japanese emerged as the dominant economic force. This is

not to suggest that economic gain was the primary motivation behind the Japanese imperialist thrust into Korea. Indeed, it seems quite clear that, initially at least, Japan's interest in Korea was more political and strategic than economic.

The primacy of the centralized authoritarian state in the colonial era has been emphasized throughout this study. The political and institutional forces allowed the development of broadly interventionist policies to deal with issues related to Seoul's urban growth. Throughout this process, the state existed as an independent, identifiable entity, with its own functions and objectives; at the same time, it was clearly situated as a constituent element of a wider set of power relations within society. In the colonial period, Seoul showed its dependence on the state with urban growth policies and market regulation, which enhanced capital accumulation and consequent urban growth. This study argues, however, that Koreans shared neither the direction of this development nor its benefits. The wealth of Korea had increased, but not the wealth of the Korean. No significant effort was made by the government-general to aid small industries and the mass of people. The urban planning progress under Japanese direction was solely for the war effort and brought neither political stability nor social welfare to Korea. Capitalistic classes, including Japanese and Korean entrepreneurs, exclusively participated in urban development projects and made great economic gains. Not surprisingly, this evidence combined the interconnected logic between the independent state theory and the capital logic theory of structuralists. The authoritarian colonial state was seen as playing to stimulate and maintain capital accumulation. Nevertheless, what should be stressed is that the colonial state acted as an independent arbiter of the class struggle, not as a subordinate. The Japanese colonial state has been aptly characterized as growth oriented and interventionist in economic affairs, promoting the peninsula as a base of Japanese economy. The state tried to incorporate Korea into the Japanese empire, not just as a colony but as a new territory, to avoid the negative aura of patronization and exploitation that had become the hallmark of disrepute for European colonialism. Nonetheless, the structuring role of the colonial state far exceeded what Stepan has observed more generally: "The administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems of the state attempt not only to structure relations between civil society and public authority in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relations within civil society as well."⁵⁹ The very opposite of Myrdal's "soft and weak state"⁶⁰ constrained by anxieties over domestic political consensus, the Japanese administration on the peninsula proved itself as a strong state primarily concerned with military security and economic productivity. The extensive role of the colonial state in urban planning through 1945 was not surprising, given the direct and often authoritarian role of the Japanese colonial administration in Korea. The developmentalist heritage of a strong and autonomous state under the Japanese colonial rule succeeded to the postindependence authoritarian Korean state.

NOTES

1. Support for the use of these variables in examining colonial urban development may be found in Sjoberg's *Cities: Their Origin and Growth* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1965).
2. For good analyses of this point, see Theda Skocpol, "Bringing State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing State Back In*, ed. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); John H. Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
3. Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), xvi.
4. All of the treaties between Korea and Japan since 1876 were unequal in content. The Treaty of Amity stipulated that Korea's ports should be opened to Japanese merchants to build houses and to engage freely in commerce. In addition, no customs duties were to be imposed on trade with Japan, and Japanese merchants could engage in commercial activities with Japanese currency in the open ports. These unequal treaties provided a legal springboard for Japan's political and economic aggressions against Korea.
5. In a country where national pride is not only very sensitive but closely connected to anti-Japanese sentiment, the idea of Japan as an agency of modernization is psychologically wrenching. Many South Koreans would naturally much rather believe that the original impetus for capitalist growth came from within Korea itself.
6. The isolation in Korean history engendered many obstacles on the road to modernization in Korea. According to Sang Chul Suh, *Growth and Structural Change in the Korean Economy, 1910-1940* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 10-19, the isolation policy prevented international contacts, which, in the West, often played a vital role in modern economic growth during the nineteenth century. It also meant a loss of the traditional source of strength for political unity of the nation by bearing a heavy burden of national defense against the frequent invasions of powerful nations (China, Japan, and Russia).
7. Foreign settlement was first established by the Chemulp'o Foreign Settlement Rule on October 3, 1884, in Inch'on. The rule was drafted by W. G. Aston, who was the first British consul-general in Seoul and acted as the leader of diplomatic officials in Seoul. For more detail, see Inch'on-si, *Inch'on Pusa* (The history of Inch'on) (Inch'on: Inch'on-si, 1976), 135.
8. Daniel S. Juhn, "Entrepreneurship in an Underdeveloped Economy: The Case of Korea, 1890-1940" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1965), 29-30.
9. The Seoul-Pusan railway was one of the four railway plans considered by the Japanese government and business in 1894 and established in 1906. At this time, Pusan had a large Japanese business community and handled most of the trade between Korea and Japan. It was the construction of this line that aroused the most interest in Japan.
10. For more details, see Seoul Metropolitan Government, *Seoul 600 Nyonsa* (The History of 600 Years in Seoul) (Seoul, 1986).
11. For a more extended discussion of the colonial health policy, see Yun-Sik Chang, "Planned Economic Transformation and Population Change," in *Korea's Response to Japan: The Colonial Period 1910-1945*, ed. C. I. Eugene Kim and D. E. Mortimore (Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1975).
12. Government-General of Chosen, *Report of Population Census* (1930), 23-35.
13. According to reports of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese emigrants totaled 640,018 in 1920, of which 275,156 went to Asia, 158,412 to North America, 139,521 to Oceania, 71,324 to South America, 3,359 to Europe, and 76 to Africa. See Yoshino Nishiyama, *Tosikeiryogaku Shushigal Setsu* (The History of Urban Planning in Japan) (Tokyo, 1978), 101-2.
14. The population density was only 883 persons per hori (1 hori equals 2.4 square miles) in Korea, as opposed to 1,886 in Japan, further facilitating population expansion.
15. Education programs were already established to assimilate Koreans into Japanese society by obliterating Korean national consciousness. This included the degradation of Korean history and the elimination of the Korean language.
16. Tsunataro Aoyki, *Chosen Techiron* (Conquest Theory of Chosen) (Seoul: Chosen Kenkyu-kai, 1923), 659. Quoted in Jong Mok Son, *Sikminji Kangjomgi Tosi Yon'gu* (The Study of the Korean City in Colonial Rule) (Seoul: Ilgi-sa, 1989).

17. See, for example, Carol A. Smith, "Theories and Measure of Urban Primacy," in *Urbanization in the World-Economy*, ed. M. Timberlake (New York: Academic Press, 1985), 209-10, and C. Ward, *The Child in the City* (New York: Collier Books, 1978).

18. For a discussion of urban primacy, see John Kasarda and Edward Crenshaw, "Third World Urbanization: Dimensions, Theories, and Determinants," *Annual Review of Sociology* 17 (1991), and Smith, "Theories and Measure of Urban Primacy."

19. This pattern is strongly similar to McGee's observation in other Southeast Asian colonial countries. He found that despite their important political, commercial, and educational roles, Southeast colonial cities did not attract large numbers of rural migrants. T. G. McGee, *The Southeast Asian City* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 142-50.

20. Carol Smith defines urban primacy as a "situation in which the largest city within an urban system is overlarge; that is, much larger than lower-ranking cities." Smith, "Theories and Measure of Urban Primacy," 90.

21. Hyun-Chin Lim, *Dependent Development in Korea* (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1989), 36, explains two differences: (1) the experience goes beyond the exchange of primary products for manufactured goods and includes sociocultural integration aimed at the Japanization of the Korean people, and (2) because of this integration policy, both development and exploitation were too intricately intertwined to be differentiated in colonial Korea, much more so than in colonial Latin America and African countries.

22. Suh, *Growth and Structural Change*, 6.

23. Japan instituted a highly sophisticated political system to rule Korea based on the Prussian model. Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), chap. 4, has described its nature as totalitarian in that it was harsher than any of its various European counterparts.

24. Sok Dam Chon et al., *Iljehaui Choson Kyongjesa* (Korean Economic History under Japanese Rule) (Seoul: Choson Chohap, 1947); Ho-Jin Choi, "The Strengthening of the Economic Domination by Japanese Colonialism," *Korean Observer* 4 (1975): 234-8.

25. The term *zibatsu* has been defined as a "system of highly centralized family control through holding companies." Chitoshi Yanaga, *Big Business in Japanese Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 38. Its distinct structure ingeniously combined Western concepts of corporation and Japan's traditional values.

26. In 1939, the Keijo Chamber of Commerce and Industry conducted a survey of all industrial establishments in Seoul and, in 1941, published the book *Keijo ni Okeru Kojo Chosa* (A Study of Industrial Establishment in Seoul).

27. Capital export to Korea was very profitable for Japanese business. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relation, 1944), 156, reports that textile corporations earned net profits of 50 percent in 1939-1940.

28. The housing problem even extended to small and medium-sized cities such as Chinju, P'ohang, and Wonsan. The newspaper *Tong-A Ilbo* reported the housing deterioration in national major cities every week for a year beginning in April 21, 1930.

29. William A. Doebele, *Land Readjustment Project* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979).

30. Historically, public urban renewal is similar to land readjustment in that it "has usually taken the form of developing new areas outside the cities, rather than reconstructing obsolescent areas within them." C. A. Doxiadis, *Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966), 15. However, within the Korean context, the concepts are different in that the former only aims to reshape the existing urban configurations, while the latter focuses on developing new urban areas by converting rural lands into the urban sphere. The most distinctive characteristic of land readjustment is that it does not place any substantial financial burden on the part of the developers (usually local governments). At present, the Land Readjustment Project is used in Germany, Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, Taiwan, and Hawaii in the United States. Its methods and procedures, however, differ from country to country.

31. Myong Chan Hwang, "Tojiguhoekjongnisaop P'yongga" (The Evaluation of the Land Readjustment Project in Korea) in *Togijongch'aeknon* (Land Policy), ed. Myong Chan Hwang (Seoul: Kyongmunhwasa, 1985), 368-9.

32. Tokuei Tosida, *Gendaitisiron* (Urban Study) (Tokyo, 1975), 231-2.

33. Moro Kobayasi, *Daitoakyoeikenno Keiseito* (Development and Destruction of Pacific Co-Property Network) (Tokyo, 1965), 79-85.

34. This argument is quoted in Tosida, *Gendaitisiron*, 231.
35. Official Gazette 3742, July 12, 1939, and Official Gazette 3743, July 13, 1939.
36. Kenjo Yamauchi, *Chosenkeizaitoseihozensho* (Chosen Economic Regulation Act) (Tokyo, 1964), 19-22.
37. The housing complexes have today become high-quality residential areas. Only a few dwellings built at that time still remain in those complexes. During the period of 1941-1945, the Chosen Housing Corporation produced 12,184 houses in Korea and 4,488 houses in Seoul. See Korea National Housing Corporation, *KNHC Samsipnonsa* (The History of Thirty Years in KNHC) (Seoul), 64-5.
38. Clarence Perry, *Housing for the Machine Age* (New York: Russell, 1939). Actual planning with the neighborhood unit has been used, mostly unintentionally, to segregate racial and ethnic groups into distinct locations.
39. Kyongsong-bu (Seoul), *Kyongsong Sigaji Chegaebal* (Town Replanning Report) (1934).
40. According to Yo Song Lee and So Yong Kim, *Sutja Chosen Yon'gu* (The Study of Korea in Figures) (Seoul: Kuk'hakjarouwon, 1987), 97-9, based on a few materials on the announcement of the Chosen Municipal District Planning Act, they estimate that the rate of Korean landownership in the major cities was 42 percent in Seoul, 38 percent in P'yongyang, 23 percent in Taegu, 25 percent in Pusan, and 22 percent in Inch'on.
41. *Chongbo* is an acreage unit, equivalent to hectare. One *chongbo* estimates 9,917.4 square meters, while one hectare is 10,000 square meters.
42. Paul Reinsch's book *Colonial Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), distinguishes a colony from a dependency on the grounds that the latter is more inclusive than the former. Such a distinction may have some geographical significance, but in the political and economic realm, the terms are practically indistinguishable.
43. This can be inferred from the fact that the governor-general was appointed directly by the crown from army or navy officers to command the forces in defense of Japan and to exercise supreme control over the administration. He was authorized to memorialize the throne and receive imperial sanction through the prime minister and to issue general ordinances in virtue of his delegated or discretionary power. In practice, the governor-general was the lawgiver, the chief executive, the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and the highest tribunal. See Henry P. Chung, *The Case of Korea* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1921), 61; Edward Chen, "Attempt to Integrate the Empire," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 259.
44. Shannon McCune, *Korea's Heritage* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1967), 30.
45. Chang, "Planned Economic Transformation and Population Change," 291-300.
46. George A. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 37.
47. "It was the Japanese who constituted almost the entire middle and upper classes of Chosen." Henderson, *Korea*, 97.
48. See, for example, Dennis McNamara, *The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise, 1910-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the North East Asian Political Economy," in *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, ed. F. D. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
49. Cumings, "Origins and Development," 56.
50. Han wrote in his autobiography that many Korean landowners became bank officials or prominent Korean businessmen in later years. For example, all of the top executives of the Korean Life Insurance Company, established in 1921, were members of the *yangban* class. see Sang Yong Han, *Kan Soryo Kun wa Kataru* (Reminiscences by Han Sang Yong) (Keijo, 1941), 54.
51. In this time, the council's primary purpose was to reward with sinecure some seventy former pro-Japanese high officials of Korea.
52. Korean society during the colonial period marked the decline of the *yangban* class as a ruling and privileged entity, with the disappearance of the traditional class. But it is not doubtful that some members of the formal *yangban* class, especially the pro-Japanese groups, became social leaders and leaders of the commercial and industrial enterprises that were at the forefront of the Korean economy at that time.
53. Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Kochang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986).
54. For example, Pak Yong Hyo, a director of the Chosen Bank, and Pak Yong Chol, a vice president of the Oriental Development Company, played prominent roles in the middle decades of Japanese rule as advisers and consultants. McNamara, *Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise*, 114-25.

55. Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), 431.

56. Nishiyama, *Tosikeiryogku Stsushigal Setsu*, 109.

57. Based on a few materials from the Department of Urban Planning in the Ministry of Construction, of 395 land adjustment works from the colonial period until 1985, only 70 programs have been implemented by private corporations.

58. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire*, 249-60.

59. Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), xii.

60. Myrdal wrote that "soft states" are ones in which "governments require extraordinary little of their citizens" and "obligations that do exist are enforced inadequately if at all." Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, vol. 2 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), 896.